This paper o¤ers a model of crowdfunding that represents a growing area of interest among practitioners and theorists. It is one of the …rst articles analyzing the choice between the di¤erent types of crowdfunding (reward-based vs. equity-based) and the choice between crowdfunding and traditional …nancing. The model is based on standard market imperfections such as asymmetric information and moral hazard as well as on some speci…c features of crowdfunding including the market feedback regarding new projects. The model provides several implications, most of which have not yet been tested. For example, we …nd that when asymmetric information is important, high-quality projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding. The choice of an all-or-nothing mechanism as opposed to a keep-it-all can serve as a signal of a …rm's quality ("signalling by riskbearing"). Crowdfunding is selected over a traditional bank loan if the demand for the product is either very small or very large.
Introduction
Crowdfunding is the practice of funding a start-up company or project by raising funds from a large number of people. It is usually performed on-line. The volume of funds raised using crowdfunding has been quickly growing the last 5-7 years. In 2009 the volume of funds raised using crowdfunding was negligeably small. neurial …rm setting a fundraising goal and keeping nothing unless the goal is achieved, thereby shifting the risk to the entrepreneur. Kickstarter follows an "all or nothing"or threshold model, so funders'pledged money is only collected if the goal is reached. While other crowdfunding e¤orts do not always follow this model, it is currently the dominant approach to crowdfunding, and parallels the way that other funding e¤orts for new ventures work. Our model is also re‡ective of the fact that crowdfunding is an area where production decisions and …nance are closely connected. The crowdfunding method choice directly and indirectly a¤ects the development of a project and its promotion, production scale and price decisions.
In our model each type of …nancing has its cost and bene…ts. Under rewardbased crowdfunding, it is harder to achieve the fundraising goal with large projects since the funders'potential bene…ts do not include the …rm's long-term pro…ts unlike under equity-based crowdfunding. On the other hand, the entrepreneur's stake of equity is reduced under equity-based crowdfunding, which a¤ects pricing and production decisions. In particular, we …nd that in this case, prices are higher and production quantities are lower than optimal since the entrepreneur receives less than 100% of the bene…ts from increasing production while bears a non-shared extra-cost, therefore, the entrepreneur chooses a lower level of production. We also …nd that high-quality projects are likely to chose reward-based crowdfunding as a signal of quality. Also, they are more likely to be funded through the AON scheme. Low-quality or high-risk projects are less likely to mimick high-quality …rms and chose AON, which implies more fundrasing responsability and risks, and prefer KIA instead. Traditional bank …nancing may lead to bankruptcy if the …rm is unsuccessful. So the magnitude of the bankruptcy cost plays a role in the …nancing method choice. If these costs are high enough, the entrepreneur may prefer crowdfunding since, formally, crowdfunding does not neccessarily lead to bankruptcy if the crowdfunding campaign or production fails. However, under reward-based crowdfunding, indirect costs of distress may arise related to consumer protection law in case products are not delivered to customers. We …nd that a separating equilibrium where highquality …rms select reward-based crowdfunging can only exist if these costs are relatively high. Finally, unlike traditional …nancing, crowdfun…ng provides market feedback. When this feature of crowdfunding is introduced into the basic model, we …nd that crowdfunding is selected over a traditional bank loan if the demand for the product is either very small or very large.
As was mentioned previously, the number of theoretical papers on crowdfunding is relatively small. Note the following. Belle ‡amme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher (2010) identify a number of issues related to crowdfunding from an industrial organization perspective. In their model, they analyze rewardbased crowdfunding with pre-ordering and price discrimination, and study the conditions under which crowdfunding is preferred to traditional forms of external funding. In the second model, crowdfunding is a way to make a product better known to consumers. The authors argue that non-pro…t organizations tend to be more successful in using crowdfunding.
Belleammey, Lambertz and Schwienbacher (2014) compare reward-based and equity-based crowdfunding. In either case, the funders enjoy community bene…ts that increase their utility. It is shown that the entrepreneur prefers pre-ordering if the initial capital requirement is relatively small compared to the market size and prefers pro…t sharing otherwise. Belleammey et al (2014) also o¤er some extensions on the impact of quality uncertainty and information asymmetry but in these extensions the choice between di¤erent forms of crowdfunding and other forms of …nancing is not modelled. As the authors mentioned, further research is required. Strausz (2017) studies entrepreneurs'interactions with customers before investment using the mechanism design approach. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, crowdfunding improves the screening of potential customers. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this bene…t. Studying the subsequent tradeo¤ between screening and moral hazard, the paper characterizes optimal mechanisms. E¢ ciency is sustainable only if returns exceed investment costs by a margin re ‡ecting the degree of moral hazard. Constrained e¢ cient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment.
Hu, Li, and Shi (2014) study the optimal product and pricing decisions in a crowdfunding all-or-nothing mechanism. When the buyers are su¢ ciently heterogenous in their product valuations, the creator should o¤er a line of products with di¤erent levels of product quality. Compared to the traditional situation where orders are placed and ful…lled individually, with the crowdfunding mechanism, a product line is more likely to be optimal than a single product and the quality gap between products is smaller. The paper also shows the e¤ect of the crowdfunding mechanism on pricing dynamics over time. Together, these results underscore the substantial in ‡uence of the emerging crowdfunding mechanisms on common marketing decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and some preliminary results. Section 3 through 6 discuss the consequences of introducing di¤erent kinds of market imperfections into the basic model and their implications for crowdfunding decisions. Section 7 analyzes cases that involve several market imperfections simultaneously. Section 8 discusses the consistency of the model's predictions with observed empirical evidence. Section 9 discusses the model's robustness and its potential extensions and Section 10 is a conclusion to the study.
Basic Model
An entrepreneurial …rm has monopoly power over its innovative product or service. The …xed costs of launching the production equal I. The …rm intends to sell its product in two consecutive periods. In period t = 1; 2, if the …rm produces q t units, it costs cq t in total. The demand for the good in each period is given by the inverse demand function p t = a q t . 4 The …rm needs funds to cover its start-up costs and is considering crowdfunding. Under reward-based crowdfunding the …rm collects pre-orders for period 1. 5 Under equity-based crowdfunding, the …rm sells a fraction of the …rm. Funders and entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral and the risk-free interest rate is 0. A two-period model will help us understand the di¤erence between basic features of di¤er-ent types of crowdfunding (like long-term character of earnings in the case of equity-based crowdfunding vs. short-term rewards in the case of reward-based crowdfunding) as well as capture some other important features of crowdfunding such as incorporating market feedback during period 1 into the product quality. Since crowdfunding is usually used to cover the start-up costs, period 2 …nancing is not explicitly modelled. The capital structure and the ownership structure will remain the same in period 2 as they are at the end of period 1. Earnings will be distributed accordingly.
Reward-Based Crowdfunding: Pre-orders
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects p 1 (pre-order price). The demand for the product is determined. If p 1 q 1 < I + cq 1 , the …rm is liquidated. 6 Otherwise, the entrepreneur collects pro…t (p 1 c)(a p 1 ) I.
2. Firm selects p 2 . The entrepreneur collects pro…t (p 2 c)(a p 2 ).
In this setting, the …rm selects a pre-order price in order to maximize its pro…ts. The constraint, however, comes from the necessity to collect the amount of money required to launch production.
In period 2, the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize (p 2 c)(a p 2 ), which gives p 2 = a+c 2 . In period 1, the …rm maximizes (p 1 c)(a p 1 ) I subject to: p 1 q 1 = p 1 (a p 1 ) I + cq 1 = I + c(a p 1 ). This condition means that the amount of pre-orders should cover the start-up cost (…xed costs and the period 1's variable costs).
Two cases are possible. If
robustness with regard to changes in the demand functions and other features of the model. 5 Existing studies consider consumer …nancing through pre-ordering, bootstrap …nancing (see, e.g., Winborg and Landstrom, 2001; and Ebben and Johnson, 2006) or working capital loans. However, they do not usually distinguish between advance payments made at the very beginning of an entrepreneurial initiative and those made during the course of further developments. Crowdfunding pertains speci…cally to the …nancing of innovative entrepreneurial projects. There are many features of this type of …nancing such as market feedback from a large number of funders, which is typically not included in existing studies on consumer …nancing or bootstrap …nancing etc. 6 The presence of thresholds for the minimum required amount of funds (the poject fails if the thresholds are not met) is typical in crowdfunding. We begin our analysis with a natural assumption as to why this occurs: a …rm's inability to cover the start-up costs. In Section 5 we will discuss other reasons for possible thresholds. then p 1 = a+c 2 . The …rm's pro…t over the two periods equals = (a c)
If (1) fails, the …rm will not be able to raise the funds needed to launch the production. When the required amount of initial investment is quite large, reward-based crowdfunding may not be an option.
Equity-Crowdfunding: Pro…t-Sharing
1. Firm selects (the fraction of the …rm for sale) and p 1 and sells for price M . If M < I + cq 1 , the …rm is liquidated.
2. Firm selects p 2 .
In this setting, the …rm has more ‡exibility in rasing the initial amount of investments, since the funders can also count on the second period's (future) pro…t.
In period 2, the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize the entrepreneur's pro…t (1 )(p 2 c)(a p 2 ), which makes p 2 = a+c 2 . The …rm's pro…t in period 2 is . In period 1, the …rm chooses and p 1 to maximize the entreprneur's expected pro…t over the two periods:
subject to M I + cq 1
The funders'expected earnings should cover their investment cost or:
For the optimal solution the conditions (4) and (5) will be binded because the …rm can always make as small as necessary to satisfy them. Then we have:
Substituting this into (3) makes the entrepreneur's expected pro…t over the two periods equal to:
The entrepreneur's expected pro…t then equals (a c)
As we can see, it is the same amount as in (2). This is not surprising given that in the absence of any …nancial market imperfections every type of …nancing should have the same result (similar to Modigliani-Miller proposition (1958) ) as long as they …t into the budget constraints.
Lemma 1. If I is su¢ ciently small ( I), the …rm is indi¤ erent between reward-based and equity-based crowdfunding. If I is large, equity-based crowdfunding is preferred.
The proof of this lemma follows from the above analysis. If I is small, the …rm's pro…t is the same under the two types of crowdfunding ( (2) and (7)). If I is large, it follows from the previous subsection that the …rm is not able to raise enough funds to cover its start-up costs using a reward-based crowdfunding.
Lemma 1 shows that equity-based crowdfunding has a "technical" advantage for large projects (high …xed costs I and high variable costs c). Since our focus is on the role of market imperfections, we will usually assume that condition (1) holds in the further analysis, i.e. both types of crowdfunding are feasible.
Moral hazard: costly entrepreneurial e¤ort
So far we assumed that the decisions about and p 1 are made simultaneously. We know, however, that under equity-based crowdfunding, the entrepreneur's share of the company is less than 100% after funds are raised and therefore the entrepreneur's incentive may be di¤erent than it would be under reward-based crowdfunding.
7 Hence, we consider a situation where the cost of production also includes the entrepreneur's own e¤ort. We assume that this e¤ort costs eq. Following similar calculations to those in the previous subsection, one can see that under reward-based crowdfunding p 1 = p 2 = a+c+e 2 and the entrepreneur's pro…t equals (a c e)
Under equity-based crowdfunding the results may be di¤erent because of the entrepreneurial moral hazard resulting from the reduced equity stake. The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects and sells it for price M .
2. Firm selects p 1 .
3. Firm selects p 2 .
I, the …rm prefers reward-based crowdfunding; 2) Prices are higher and the quantity produced is lower under equitybased crowdfunding than under reward-based crowdfunding.
Proof. See Appendix.
As shown in the Appendix,
. Under equity-based crowdfunding, the price is higher than it is under reward-based crowdfunding. This is intuitive because the entrepreneur reaps less than 100% of the bene…ts from increasing production while bears a non-shared extra-cost, therefore, the entrepreneur chooses a lower level of production.
It is also shown that the entrepreenur's pro…t over the two periods equals
If = 0, (9) will be equal to I. It was mentioned above that it would be the same value as it would be in the case of reward-based crowdfunding. When is positive, the entrepreneur's pro…t under equity crowdfunding will be smaller since the derivative of (9) in is negative. It is consistent with the idea of agency cost.
Asymmetric information about cost
So far we assumed that investors have the same information as entrepreneurs. Now suppose that the …rm can be either a low-cost (high-e¢ ciency) producer (denoted l) or a high cost (low-e¢ ciency) producer (denoted h). More speci…-cally, suppose that c is either equal to c l or c h and c l < c h . Initially the …rm's type (the value of c) is determined and becomes known to the entrepreneur.
1. The …rm's type is revealed to the entrepreneur.
2. Firm selects …nancing strategy: reward-based crowdfunding or equitybased crowdfunding.
3. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, is determined and the …rm sells it for price M . If M < I + cq 1 , the …rm is liquidated.
4. Firm selects p 1 .
An equilibrium is de…ned as a situation where no …rm type has an incentive to deviate. Since private information only concerns the production cost and not the demand side, the informational game will only a¤ect the equity-crowdfunding scenario. 8 The price that potential investors will be paying for a fraction of a …rm's shares depends on their beliefs about the …rm's production cost. The information game does not a¤ect the outcome of reward-based crowdfunding. Firms will select their prices as in the case with perfect information and demand will be determined by the demand functions that are publicly known in this scenario. 9 This leads to the point that if a separating equilibrium exists, it will not be one where the high-e¢ ciency type chooses equity-based crowdfunding since it will always be mimicked by the low-e¢ ciency type. This result is typical for basic models with asymmetric information beginning with Akerlo¤ (1970) .
Proposition 2. If I is su¢ ciently small (
I), an e¢ cient separating equilibrium exists, where type l selects reward-based and type h selects pro…t-sharing. An e¢ cient separating equilibrium where type h selects rewardbased and type l selects pro…t-sharing does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix
Asymmetric information about demand
In this section, asymmetric information concerns the quality of a …rm's products and services. In particular, we assume that, unlike outside investors, …rm owners know the value of parameter a in the demand function. In the setup discussed in the previous section, a low-quality …rm will always have an incentive to mimick a high-quality …rm when the latter uses equity-based crowdfunding.
Intutively, a similar engine should drive the results if the asymmetric information regards the product's quality rather than its cost. In order to obtain new results, we introduce new strategies. In particular, if the …rm selects reward-based crowdfunding, it has two options: KIA (keep-it-all) or AON (all-or-nothing). If AON is selected, a threshold T is set, T > 0. If the amount of funds raised in period 1 is less than T , the …rm is liquidated. We also assume that the demand is as follows: q t = t (a p t ), where t = 1 with probability and 0 with probability 1
. Making the demand function stochastic or risky will allow us to see the role of AON method of crowdfunding ("signalling by risk-bearing").
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Note that some empirical research suggests that many crowdfunding projects attract very low or negligeably small amounts of funds (see, for example, Mollick (2014) , Cordova, Dolci and Gianfrate (2015) and Desjardins (2016)). 1 becomes known after the project is created and the crowdfunding method is selected. 2 becomes known in the beginning of period 2. Also, we assume that there are two types of …rms: a = a h for type h and a = a l for type l, where a h > a l . To focus on the e¤ect of asymmetric information, we assume, I = 0 (none of the results change qualitatively if I > 0). In particular it implies that condition (1) holds for both types of …rms meaning they can use reward-based crowdfunding. Also, it means that a …rm should follow the rule p > c in order to accumulate su¢ cient funds to launch their product and avoid liquidation.
2. Firm selects …nancing strategy: KIA, AON or equity-based crowdfunding. If AON is selected, the …rm selects T .
3. 1 becomes known.
4. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, the …rm selects (fraction of shares) and sells it for an amount M .
5. Firm selects p 1 .
6. If AON is selected and p 1 q 1 < T , the …rm is liquidated.
7. If KIA or AON and p 1 q 1 < cq 1 , the …rm is liquidated. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected and M < cq 1 , the …rm is liquidated.
8. Firm's type (product's quality) becomes publicly known.
9. 2 becomes known. First consider the symmetric information case for KIA. In period 2, if 2 = 1 and q = a p 2 , the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize (p 2 c)(a p 2 ), which makes p 2 = a+c 2 . If 2 = 0 and q = 0, the …rm's pro…t is zero.
In period 1, if 1 = 1 and q = a p 1 , the …rm maximizes (p 1 c)(a p 1 ). We have p 1 = a+c 2 . If 1 = 0 and q = 0, the …rm's pro…t is zero. The …rm's expected pro…t equals
Now consider AON. In this setting, the …rm selects the pre-order price in order to maximize its sales. At the same time, it needs to reach the established threshold amount of pre-orders. In some cases it will force the …rm to select a suboptimal pricing policy and in some cases (when the initial investment is su¢ ciently large), the project will not be successful. Also, bankruptcy is unavoi dable under AON, if the demand is zero. In period 2, if 2 = 1 and q = a p 2 , the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize (p 2 c)(a p 2 ), which makes p 2 = a+c In period 1, the …rm chooses T and p 1 to maximize
The solution is any T such as T p 1 (a p 1 ) where p 1 = a+c 2 . It does not avoid liquidation if demand is zero in period 1 but it optimizes the price policy if demand is positive.
The …rm's expected pro…t equals
This is smaller than (10) because under AON, bankruptcy will occur in period 1 if the amount of raised funds is smaller than T .
Finally, consider equity-based crowdfunding. In period 2, if 2 = 1 and q = a p 2 , the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize the entrepreneur's pro…t (1 )(p 2 c)(a p 2 ), which makes p 2 = a+c 2 . If If 2 = 0 and q = 0, the …rm's pro…t is zero. The …rm's expected pro…t in period 2 is
In period 1, if 1 = 1 and q = a p 2 , the …rm chooses and p 1 to maximize the entrepreneur's pro…t:
subject to M cq 1
The funders'expected earnings over the two periods should cover their investment cost or:
Under the optimal solution the conditions (13) and (14) will be binded because the …rm can always make as small as necessary to satisfy them. Then we have:
Substituting this into (12) and using the fact that if 1 = 0 and q = 0, shares are not sold and the …rm's pro…t in period 1 equals 0, we …nd that the entrepreneur's expected pro…t over the two periods equals:
This implies that p 1 = a+c 2 . The entrepreneur's expected pro…t then equals
As we can see, this is the same amount as in (10).
2 , a separating equilibrium exists, where type l selects keep-it-all and type h selects all-or-nothing or equitybased crowdfunding. An equilibrium where type h selects keep-it-all or equitybased crowdfunding does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix. The right side of the inequality in Proposition 3 puts an upper bound on the probability of bankruptcy. The intuition behind this result is as follows. AON is very costly if the probability that the demand is absent is relatively high. In this case the low-quality …rm will not mimick the high-quality …rm. If, on the contrary, is very large, the values of (10), (11) and (15) do not di¤er signi…cantly for the low-quality …rm (they are equal in the extreme case when = 1) which means that the low-quality …rm would mimick the high-quality …rm and bene…t from the market's optimistic belief about the quality of …rms that use AON. The left side of the inequality in Proposition 3 places a lower bound on the probability of bankruptcy. If, on the contrary, the probability that demand is absent is very high, it would be bene…cial for the high-quality …rm to not use AON and deviate to KIA or equity-based crowdfunding.
Bankruptcy costs and bank monitoring
In this section we compare crowdfunding with bank …nancing. If the …rm takes a bank loan and it is not able to pay back its debt then the …rm is bankrupt and can be liquidated. On the other hand, banks have a better ability to monitor and control entrepreneurs.
12 So we assume that the manager (managerial team) has some private bene…ts b from each unit produced at the expense of the …rm when the …rm uses crowdufunding. To simplify the calculations related to bankruptcy we assume that the production output is stochastic in period 1 and depends on parameter Q (similar to stochastic demand in Section 5): Q = 1 with probability and 0 with probability 1 . This implies that bankruptcy will only occur if the …rm takes a bank loan and Q = 0. In contrast to …rm liquidation cases when the required …nancing is not raised, bankruptcy does not occur as a result of failed production if the …rm uses crowdfunding. 13 For simplicity assume I = 0.
This implies that the condition I holds for both …rm types, which implies that crowdfunding is feasible for each type (similar to Section 3, formula (8)).
1 2 See, for example, Diamond (1984) . 1 3 In most countries there is no formal regulation that can be used to force a company into bankruptcy in the case of crowdfunding (see, for example, Gabison (2015) or Moores (2015) ). There is di¤erence, however, between equity-based and reward-based crowdfunding. If the …rm uses reward-based crowdfunding then the consumers are under consumer protection law etc. (Gabison (2015) ). We consider this aspect in Section 7. Here we assume that in contrast to traditional bank …nancing there is no bankruptcy in the case of crowdfunding. For simlicity it is assumed that the …rm uses equity-based crowdfunding.
1. Firm selects …nancing strategy: bank loan or crowdfunding.
3. Q becomes known. If Q = 0 and bank loan was selected, the …rm is bankrupt.
4. Firm selects p 2 .
Proposition 4. 1) Prices are higher and quantity produced is lower under crowdfunding; 2) For given values of a and , there exists a b such that the …rm chooses to take a bank loan if b b and chooses crowdfunding if b < b . For given values of a and b, the …rm chooses to take a bank loan if is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix. We …nd that the product price under bank …nancing is p = a+c= 2 and p = a+(b+c)= 2 under crowdfunding. Prices are higher and quantity produced is lower under crowdfunding because of the extra-cost related to moral hazard issues. The second part of the proposition states that crowdfunding will be preferred if the cost related to the absence of monitoring is relatively small. Otherwise, a bank loan will be preferred. Interestingly, the e¤ect of a change in the probability of bankruptcy is not as straightforward as the e¤ect of b. If the probability of bankruptcy is close to zero then a bank loan will de…nitely be preferred because of the monitoring advantage. However, in the middle range of the values for , one may …nd that an increase in bene…ts crowdfunding more than a bank loan. The reason for this follows from the price formulas above: a small ampli…es the …rm's moral hazard issues making the price further from optimal.
Hybrid cases
Ideally, the next step would be to analyze optimal …nancing policy when many factors such asymmetric information, moral hazard, market feedback etc. are present in the model simultaneusly. This is an intriguing challenge for future research. One should say that the creation of such a universal global model is technically di¢ cult and in many cases may not bring many analytical and intuitively sound results.
14 This section provides an example of such an analysis.
1 4 A good example is capital structure theory. Most intuitions published in textbooks for the last 50 years are based on models that consider each factor separately (pecking order theory for asymmetric inofrmation, trade-o¤ thoery for taxes and bankruptcy costs etc.). For an example of capital structure theory review and the role of market imperfections see Harris and Raviv (1991) , Miglo (2011) and Miglo (2016) . Models combining several factors are much less popular and much more technically complicated though some researchers suggest that these types of models are a prominnet direction for future research. Also note that based on managers' surveys, managers only support around 50% (see, for example, Graham and Harvey (2001) ) of basic theories, which means that the precentage of managers that use even more complicated ideas is even smaller. Crowdfunding theory is a much younger theory than Case 1. Consider the situation where …rms have private information about production costs (Section 4). In this situation reward-based crowdfunding can be used as a signal of a …rm's quality. Now suppose that a …rm is terminated (bankrputcy occurs) in period 1, if the …rm is not able to deliver its product to customers and the …rm uses reward-based crowdfunding (similar to the ideas from sections 5 and 6). Gabison (2015) noted 15 that eventhough there is no formal regulation of reward-based crowdfunding in most countries, in most cases consumers (funders) are under consumer protection law (which exists in most developed countries) and therefore a violation of this law can be costly for the …rm. As in Section 4, c is either equal to c l or c h and c l < c h . Like in Section 6, the production output is stochastic in period 1 and depends on parameter Q (similar to stochastic demand in Section 6): Q = 1 with probability or 0 with probability 1 . Bankruptcy only occurs when Q = 0 and the …rm uses reward-based crowdfunding. Bankruptcy does not occur as a result of failed production in period 1 under equity-based crowdfunding since by its nature no promises are made to funders/investors and dividends are not guaranteed. Like in Section 5, for simplicity we assume I = 0.
3. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, is determined and the …rm sells it for price M .
5. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected and M < cq 1 , the …rm is liquidated. If reward-based crowdfunding is selected and p 1 q 1 < cq 1 , the …rm is liquidated.
6. Q becomes known. If Q = 0 and reward-based crowdfunding was selected, the …rm goes bankrupt.
7. Firm selects p 2 .
An equilibrium is de…ned as a situation where no …rm type has the incentive to deviate. Like in Section 4, since information only concerns the production cost and not the demand side, the informational game will only a¤ect the equitycrowdfunding scenario.
capital structure theory so it is in the stage of its development where the quality and relative simplicity of its basic ideas are probably the most important objectives of its research along with managerial education on these ideas (see, for example, Loane, Ramsey and Ibbotson (2016) ).
1 5 See also Ibrahim (2016) and Moores (2015) for a legal environment analysis regarding reward-based crowdfunding. Mollick (2015) empirically analyzes the percentage of failed …rms that used reward-based crowdfunding.
Proposition 5. If a c l a c h < 2, a separating equilibrium does not exist. Otherwise, if is su¢ ciently large, the only e¢ cient separating equilibrium that exists is one where type l selects reward-based crowdfunding and type h selects pro…t-sharing.
To explain the results of this proposition, note that Section 4 found that high-quality …rms can use reward-based crowdfunding to signal their quality. That section did not consider a potential cost of reward-based crowdfunding related to bankruptcy in the case when the …rm is not able to deliver their product in period 1. This case asks if the result stands if such a cost is taken into consideration. What we found is that the result stands but there are cases when a separating equilibrium where a high-quality …rm uses reward-based crowdfuning does not exist. The meaning of the condition stated in the proposition is that if the di¤erence between the …rm types is su¢ ciently small, such an equilibrium may not exist. Secondly and more interestingly is that if the probability of bankruptcy is su¢ ciently small, an equilibrium may not exist. In this case, a low-quality …rm may still be interested in mimicking a high-quality type when the latter choses reward-based crowdfunding.
Case 2. Similar to some previous sections, this case considers a model with imperfect information. However, here we assume that crowdfunding helps the …rm obtain information about demand. Suppose that if the …rm uses crowdfunding, it can improve the product's quality after obtaining useful information about demand in period 1: more speci…cally, in period 2 the demand becomes q = sa p; s 1. 16 We assume that s has di¤erent values for di¤erent types of crowdfunding: s 2 fs r ; s e g ; s r > s e where s r is the product improvement if reward-based crowdfunding is used. s r > s e because under reward-based crowdfunding, the funders know that the …rm's launch of production and, respectively, its survival depend on their pre-orders and the …rm's response to this feedback is expected to be very e¢ cient since the …rm's survival depends on it.
17 Also, under reward-based crowdfunding, the funders have a short-term interaction with the …rm whereas under equity-based crowdfunding, these interactions are long-term. So the former incentivizes the funders to provide a more intense feedback. If the …rm uses traditional …nancing like a bank loan, for example, it does not get the same feedback as it would with crowdfunding and the demand does not change in period 2. On the other hand, as in Section 6, banks have a 1 7 Note that the market feedback represents probably the most important community bene…t of crowdfunding for the …rm (because it may increase its product quality and repsectively their future pro…ts) as well as for funders and customers who can enjoy higher quality products as a result of market feedback. Note also that we explicity model this mechanism in our model through providing better information to the …rm in period 1, which allows them to improve their product's quality in period 2 etc. Belleammey et al (2014) assume that there are some exogenously given community bene…ts in period 1 as a result of crowdfunding. Note that Cholakova and Clarysse (2015) …nd that non-monetary bene…ts do not play a singi…cant role for funders. better ability to monitor and control the entrepreneurs. 18 We assume that the manager has some private bene…ts b when using crowdfunding.
1. Firm selects a …nancing strategy: bank loan, reward-based crowdfunding or equity-based crowdfunding.
2. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, the …rm chooses (the fraction of the …rm for sale) and sells it for price M . If M < I + cq 1 , the …rm is liquidated.
3. Firm selects p 1 . The demand for the product is determined.
4. Firm selects p 2 . The demand for the product is determined.
Proposition 6. For a given value of a, if I is su¢ ciently small, the …rm takes a bank loan if s r is su¢ ciently small or b is su¢ ciently large. Otherwise, the …rm selects reward-based crowdfunding. If I is su¢ ciently large, the …rm takes a bank loan if s e is su¢ ciently small or b is su¢ ciently large. Otherwise, the …rm selects equity-based crowdfunding. Prices are higher and quantity produced is lower under crowdfunding. For a given value of I, crowdfunding is selected over a traditional bank loan if a is either very small or very large. For medium levels of a, a bank loan is preferred.
It shown in the Appendix that the entrepreneur's pro…ts under the di¤erent strategies are equal to the following. 
1 8 Other traditional forms of entrepreneurial …nancing such as venture capital …nancing also have a high degree of monitoring so the model can be applied to those cases as well.
Also if
the …rm will not be able to use reward-based crowdfunding. And if (a c b) 2 4I, the …rm prefers reward-based crowdfunding over equity-based crowdfunding. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium decision-making for the entrepreneurs. The lines represent equations (16), (17) and (18). Letters RC, EC and B denote the areas where the entrepreneurs choose reward-based crowdfunding, equity-based crowdfunding, and a bank loan respectively. As follows from Figure 1 , …rms that use crowdfunding are either projects with very small demand or very high demand. Also, entrepreneurs with EC have higher I for any value of a compared to entrepreneurs with RC. Overall we can see that …rms with a medium level of demand prefer B, …rms with stronger demand prefer crowdfunding, …rms with a large amount of investments and strong demand or very weak demand prefer EC and …rms with smaller investments and strong demand or very weak demand prefer RC.
Implications
Our paper has several implications for an entrepreneurial …rm's choice of …nanc-ing. The summary of the results is presented in Table 1 .
Market imperfection(s) Results

Asymmetric information about production cost
Good quality projects prefer rewardbased crowdfunding Entrepreneur's moral hazard due to his reduced equity stake Firms prefer reward-based crowdfunding. Prices are higher and quatity produced is lower under equity-based crowdfunding Asymmetric information about demand "Signalling by risk-bearing". Low-quality …rm selects KIA or equity-based crowdfunding and high-quality …rm selects AON Bankruptcy costs vs. bank monitoring Prices are higher and quantity produced is lower under crowdfunding than under a bank loan Hybrid case 1 (asymmetric information about demand and bankruptcy costs)
If bankrupcy costs are high, …rms use reward-based crowdfunding to signal their quality Hybrid case 2 (market feedback, bank monitoring)
Prices are higher and quantity produced is lower under crowdfunding. Crowdfunding is selected over a traditional bank loan if demand is either very small or very large. Table 1 . Market imperfections and the model' s results. Proposition 2, 3 and 5 imply that when asymmetric information is important, high-quality projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding. This is contradictory, to some extent, to the spirit of the results in Belleammey et al (2014) , which …nds that asymmetric information favors equity-based crowdfunding.
19 Note, however, that the objective of their analysis is di¤erent from ours. For example, they do not analyze the case when the decision about the choice of crowdfunding mode is part of the model (this is obviously a crucial part of our model; consequently they automatically do not consider the possibility that …rms can signal their quality with their choice of crowdfunding) so they only compare the symmetric and asymmetric information cases within each type of crowdfunding. Also, it is mentioned in Belleammey et al (2014) that their analysis of the asymmetric information case is not complete. 20 In our model, equity-based crowdfunding su¤ers more from asymmetric information, which is consistent with the spirit of the majority of …nance literature where equity-…nancing is 1 9 For example, it is well-known in capital structure theory that asymmetric information damages equity …nancing more than debt …nancing and that equity …nancing can not be used by a high-quality type as a signal of quality whereas in some cases debt …nancing can be used (Leland and Pyle (1977) ). So applying this example to Belleamey et al (2014) , who claim that asymmetric information is more damaging for reward-based crowdfunding, it would be no surprise to …nd that a separating equilibrium where a high-quality …rm uses reward-based crowdfunding does not exist or that there is a separating equilibrium where the high-quality …rm uses equity-based crowdfunding.
2 0 Among other things note, for example, that the proof of Lemma 5, which is crucial for Proposition 2, relies on numerical simulations, Section 4.2.2 is not …nished and, as mentioned above, the case when the decision about the choice of crodwfunding mode is part of the model is not analyzed.
generally the most sensitive to the asymmetric information problem. Equitybased crowdfuning cannot be used as a signalling tool by a high-quality …rm since it will always be mimicked by a low quality …rm as the share price of a high-quality …rm is always higher than that of a low-quality …rm. In contrast, a high-qulity can use reward-based crowdfunding. This is because a low-quality …rm may …nd it unproftable to mimick this strategy as it will be taking more risk to achieve its threshold. This prediction has not been directly tested but is consistent with the spirit of the results found in Ahlers, Cumming, Guenther, and Schweizer (2015) and Mollick (2014) (that the …rm's …nancing choice can serve as a signal of a project's quality). Furthermore, the entrepreneur's larger fraction of equity is associated with a higher project quality. In our case, reward-based crowdfunding implies a higher fraction of ownership held by the entrepreneur. Ahlers et al (2015) examine the e¤ectiveness of the signals used by entrepreneurs to induce (small) investors to commit …nancial resources in an equity-based crowdfunding context. They found that retaining equity is an e¤ective signal and can therefore strongly impact the probability of a funding's success. It is consistent with the spirit of our result that reward-based crowdfunding may be preferred by entrepreneurs of higher quality.
Proposition 3 implies that high-quality projects may prefer AON over KIA. This is consistent with the spirit of Cumming, Leboeuf and Schwienbacher (2014) . They show that KIA campaigns are less successful in meeting their fundraising goals. Also, note that the rate of success of campaigns on Kickstarter, which only uses AON, is higher than on Indiegogo.
21
Proposition 1 and 4 imply that pricing and production strategies are affected by moral hazard issues and the costs of …nancial distress. In particular, prices can be higher and quantity produced can be lower under equity-based crowdfunding. This is consistent with Paakkarinen (2016) that noted that in contrast to pre-ordering, pro…t sharing may have fewer customers, but higher margins. More broadly, the point that moral hazard issues related to the entrepreneurial cost of e¤ort and the reduced equity stake are more important, under equity-based crowdfunding is consistent with Gabison (2015) and Paakkarinen (2016) , which noted that equity-based crowdfunding is much more constricted in comparison to other forms of crowdfunding.
As follows from Moores (2015) , the bankruptcy procedure is not clearly de…ned in the case of a failed crowdfunding campaign, in fact, the …rm may not even be declared bankrupt even though consumers are under the customer protection law (at least in the case of reward-based crowdfunding). As noted in Moores (2015) , further development and clari…cations in this area are helpful. Our analysis suggests that from a policy perspective higher bankruptcy costs are bene…tial for the exsitence of separating equilibria where high-quality …rms can use reward-based crowdfunding to singal their quality and avoid being mimicked by low-quality …rms.
As follows from Proposition 6, …rms should avoid crowdfunding if moral hazard considerations related to the weak ability of funders to monitor the …rm (compared to traditional …nancing from bank loans or venture capital …nancing) are very important. These results are consistent with Xu (2017) that …nds that entrepreneurs swich between crowdfunding an bank borrowing depending on the relative costs of …nancing. Also, and perhaps more interestingly is that if we only consider reward-based crowdfunding vs. bank …nancing (the area above line (18) in Figure 1 ), projects with high I and high a, i.e potentially high risk, high investment (novelty) and potentially high demand (a) will prefer crowdfunding vs. bank …nancing. This is also consistent with Xu (2017) . Finally, we …nd that …rms should use crowdfunding for either projects with a very small demand or a very high demand. Also, …rms that use equity-based crowdfunding have a higher amount of …xed costs compared to entrepreneurs with reward-based crowdfunding.
In Belleammey et al (2014) price discrimination is not possible in the absence of non-monetary bene…ts, and therefore both forms of crowdfunding yield exactly the same outcome as seeking money from a bank or a large equity investors. Some research discovered however that the role of such non-monetary bene…ts in crowdfunding is negligeable (see, for example, Cholakova and Clarysse (2015) ). In our model, there are no non-monetary bene…ts from crowdfunding but the bene…ts of crowdfunding (compared to traditional …nancing) arise from natural features of crowdfunding such as market feedback. Note that overall, the focus of most existing theoretical papers on cowdfunding has been to exploit features of crowdfunding like the opportunity for the entrepreneur to price discriminate. However, recent literature …nds empirically that crowdfunding also has a lot of informational value for entrepreneurs. Hence, our article mostly focuses on the latter aspect of crowdfunding.
Finally, note that from Lemma 1, large projects, in most cases, prefer equitybased crowdfunding. As mentioned previously, in our case this is not due to the presence of …nancial market imperfections but to the fact that funders can count on long-term …rm pro…ts in the case of equity-based crowdfunding. As mentioned previously, this result in Belleammey et al (2014) is due to the assumptions about community bene…ts in period 1 when …rm conducts crowdfunding. These bene…ts di¤er among funders in the case of a reward-based campaign so the small size of the crowdfunding allows the …rm to capture these di¤erences very e¢ ciently, while in the equity-based case community bene…ts are more uniform so there is no advantage of having a small scale. As follows from Paakkarinen (2016), equity-based campaigns are much larger than reward-based campaigns but …rms select equity-based campaigns mostly for possibility of collecting a large amounts of capital and not to select a better price discrimination approach.
The model extensions and robustness
Di¤ erent demand functions. Our focus in this article is to analyze the role of di¤erent market imperfections in crowdfunding. That is why we adopt a relatively simple demand function. In dynamic monopoly pricing literature this approach is not unusual (see, for example, Demichelis and Tarola (2006)). Most of our results (such as Propositions 1, 2 etc.) are intuitively sound and will hold if mathematically di¤erent demand functions are used. Alternatively, a sigi…cantly di¤erent approach of modelling the demand side can be taken where individual customers with di¤erent demand functions are included (see, for example, Belleammey et al (2014) and Hu, Li and Shi (2014) ). This approach is often used in industrial organization or price discrimination literature. Our focus is on market imperfections and …nancial aspects of crowdfunding and the approach that uses total demand functions from investors/funders (the market) is very common.
22 Note also that Belleammey et al (2014) make the ad-hoc assumption that crowdfunding provides an automatic bene…t to funders.
Di¤ erent types of moral hazard. In our model (Section 3), the entrepreneurial moral hazard takes place because the entrepreneur's equity stake in the …rm is reduced while his individual e¤ort is costly and this cost is not shared. This approach is very common in …nancing literature (starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976) ) and typically creates an agency cost of equity …nancing as in our paper. There are many di¤erent ways to analyze moral hazard issues, for example, to explicitely model the entrepreneur's level of e¤ort. This apaproach is quite common in contract literature. In …nance literature this approach was used, for example, in Innes (1991). The result of that analysis reveals the advantage of debt …nancing over equity …nancing which is consistent with the spirit of our modelling where equity-based crowdfunding has a disadvantage due to entrepreneurial moral hazard. In Section 6 we again use moral hazard to compare crowdfunding and bank loans using the idea that bank …nancing provides better monitoring. This idea is standard in …nance literature (see, for example, Diamond (1984) ).
The distribution of types. In sections 4 and 5, which deal with asymmetric information we use two types of …rms to illustrate the main ideas. This is also very typical in literature. A natural question though is whether the results stand if one considers a case with multiple types. Our analysis shows 23 that most conclusions remain the same: under asymmetric information, equity-based crowdfunding is an inferior choice compared to reward-based crowdfunding. In the case of multiple types, however, one may have a semi-separating or even pooling equilibrium where only the type with the highest cost (speaking about Section 4) will be indi¤erent between the two types of crowdfunding and all other types select reward-based crowdfunding. In Section 5, our analysis shows that the results may hold even in a multiple types environment though more research is required. The main implication of our analysis holds. In particular, our results show that there is no semi-separating equlibrium where the average quality of types that choose equity-based crowdfunding or the KIA method is higher than those that choose AON, which is consistent with our basic model.
Mixed …nancing and more types of …nancing. Unlike capital structure literature, where debt/equity mix is a very common strategy (as opposite to pure equity or pure debt …nancing), simultaneously conducting di¤erent kinds of crowdfunding is not common. Nevertheless, if mixed …nancing is allowed in period 1, most results will stand. For example, if mixing bank debt and crowdfunding is allowed in period 1, as in Section 2, the results stand though the condition (1) can be softened for a …rm if it uses equity-based crowdfunding. Similarly, Proposition 1 stands qualitatively but the formulas will be quantitaively di¤erent. In Sections 3 and 4, a signalling equilibrium may still exist where a high-quality …rm uses a mix of reward-based crowdfunding and a bank loan or a mix of a bank loan and AON, as in Section 4, although restricting conditions will change quantitatively. Introducing additional …nancing strategies such as debt-based crowdfunding is an interesting direction. Most resutls regarding the costs and bene…ts of di¤erent …nancing strategies found in this paper are quite general and do not depend on introduction of more options in the model. Quantitatively though, some conditions may change. It is de…nitely an interesting direction for future research. Note that most existing theoretical literature on crowdfunding does often consider reward-based and equity-based crowdfunding separately from debt-based crowdfunding. One of the reasons for this seems to be that the founders' objectives are quite di¤erent in these scenarios (see, for example, Hildebrand, Puri, and Rocholl (2014) ).
Conclusions
Most existing theoretical papers on crowdfunding consider static models.
24 This paper is one of the …rst papers that analyzes a dynamic (two-period) model of crowdfunding. Existing theoretical literature on crowdfunding has extensively focused on such features of crowdfunding as price discrimination. This paper is one of the …rst that focuses on information aspects of crowdfunding, which is more in the spirit of …nance literature than industrial organization literature. In particular, this is one of the …rst papers that obtains analytical results for models with asymmetric information. Most existing literature focuses more on moral hazard issues. Also, this paper is one of the …rst that analyzes the choice between di¤erent types of crowdfunding (reward-based vs. equity-based) and the choice between crowdfunding and traditional …nancing. In addition to traditional forms of markets imperfections (asymmetric information, moral hazard, bankruptcy costs etc.) our model includes some other features of crowdfunding such as market feedback. The model provides several implications, most of which have not been yet been tested. When asymmetric information is important, highquality projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding. The choice of the all-ornothing mechanism as opposed to keep-it-all can serve as a signal of a …rm's quality. Finally, crowdfunding is selected over a traditional bank loan if the demand for the product is either very small or very large.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. In period 2, the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize the entrepreneur's pro…t
, which makes p 2 = a+c+e (1 ) 2 . In period 1, after shares are sold, the …rm chooses . In both cases, under the optimal strategy chosen by the …rm M = I + cq 1 .
The funders anticipate it and therefore M and will be connected as follows:
Then we have:
Substituting this into (19) and (20) we get that the entrepreneur's expected pro…t over the two periods equal to:
In the beginning of period 1, the entrepreneur selects to maximize (22). The case where
+ a is not optimal. The …rm should increase M and becasue of the following. (22) I. This is the same value as under a reward-based crowdfunding scenario. When is positive, the entrepreneur's pro…t under equity crowdfunding will be smaller since the derivative of (23) in is negative. Proof of Proposition 2. Consider a situation where l selects reward-based crowdfunding and h selects pro…t-sharing. If I is su¢ ciently small, we have (based on Section 2 calculations)
where j is the equilibrium pro…t of type j (all calculations are based on the symmetric information case for each type described in the previous section). Also we have (as follows from (21))
h does not have an incentive to mimick l since, as mentioned above, in this section asymmetric information does not concern reward-based crowdfunding. So if h chose reward-based crowdfunding it would have the same payo¤ as it would in equilibrium:
I. Now suppose that l mimics h and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. l's pro…t lh then equals
In this equation p 2l = a+c l 2 (as follows from Section 2) and h is determined by (26). Note that when l mimicks h, it has to sell a larger stake of equity in the …rm compared to the symmetric information case. Indeed if l sells equity under symmetric information we have
This is smaller than (26) because c l < c h . Note that the amount of funds raised will be di¤erent under symmetric information. Keeping unused cash is useless so prices and quantities will be di¤erent from the symmetric information case for type l. More speci…cally, we have
Indeed, I + c h q h = I + c h (a p 1h ) is the amount of funds raised for selling shares. From this amount, I will cover the …xed costs for l. The remaining amount c h (a p 1h ) will be used to cover the variable costs of production, which are equal to c l per unit for type l. Also
It implies
This is less than (25) because c l < c h . Therefore l will not mimick h. Now consider a situation where h selects reward-based crowdfunding and l selects pro…t-sharing. As before we have
Suppose that h mimics l and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. Using similar reasoning one can show that h's pro…t hl equals
This is greater than (28) because c l < c h . Therefore h will mimick l. This means that such an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a situation where type l selects keep-it-all and type h selects all-or-nothing. First we have
where 1j is the equilibrium pro…t of type j (all calculations are based on the symmetric information case for each type described in the previous section). Suppose that l mimics h and chooses AON. We have Comparing with (29) we …nd that h does not deviate if
Note that conditions (31) and (32) do not contradict each other. It is because the right side of (32) is smaller than that of (31). Indeed let x = (
2 . Then the following makes the comparison described in the previous sentence:
, which always holds. Consider a situation where type h selects keep-it-all and type l selects allor-nothing. First we have
where 1j is the equilibrium pro…t of type j (all calculations are based on symmetric information case for each type described in previous section). Suppose that l mimics h and chooses KIA. We have
This is greater than (34) because a h > a l and < 1. So a situation where type h selects keep-it-all and type l selects all-or-nothing is not an equilibrium. Finally, consider a situation where type h selects equity-based crowdfunding. We have
(if l selects KIA, (36) holds as an equality). Suppose that l mimics h and chooses equity-based crowdfunding. l's pro…t lh then equals
where:
This is greater than (36) because a l < a h . Therefore l will mimick h and such an equilibrium does not exist. Proof of Proposition 4. Consider crowdfunding. Calculations are similar to Section 4. In period 2, the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize the entrepreneur's pro…t (1 )( p 2 c b)(a p 2 ), which makes p 2 = a+(b+c)= 2 . In period 1, after the shares are sold, the …rm chooses p 1 to maximize (1
. It implies:
. The …rm's expected pro…t in period 1 is p 1 (a p 1 ) = (a+(c+b)= )(a (c+b)= ) 4 . The funders'expected earnings should cover their investment cost or:
Under optimal solution the conditions (37) and (39) will be bounded because the …rm can always make as small as necessary to satisfy them. Then we have:
The entrepreneur's expected pro…t over the two periods equals:
Consider bank loan …nancing. In period 2, the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize ( p 2 c)(a p 2 ) which makes p 2 = a+c= 2
. Note that this is smaller than (38).
The …rm's expected pro…t in period 2 is
In period 1, the …rm maximizes (p 1 (a p 1 ) +
The solution gives us p 1 = a+c= 2 . The …rm's pro…t over the two periods equals
The comparison of (40) and (41) leads to the …rst part of Proposition 4. In particular, (40) is decreasing, which implies that the …rm prefers crowdfunding if b is su¢ ciently small. Also, when = 1, (41) is strictly greater than (40).
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider a situation where l selects reward-based crowdfunding and h selects pro…t-sharing.
Consider …rm h. Calculations are similar to Section 4. In period 2, the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize the entrepreneur's pro…t (1 )( p 2 c h )(a p 2 ), which makes p 2 = a+c h = 2 . In period 1, after the shares are sold, the …rm chooses p 1 to maximize (1 )( p 1 (a p 1 ) + M c h q 1 ) subject to
. The …rm's expected pro…t in period 1 is p 1 (a p 1 ) = (a+c h = )(a c h = ) 4
. The funders'expected earnings should cover their investment cost or:
Under the optimal solution the conditions (42) and (43) will be bounded because the …rm can always make as small as necessary to satisfy them. Then we have: The entrepreneur's expected pro…t over the two periods equals:
(1 c h a )( a(a c h = ) 2 ) = ( a c h )
Consider …rm l. In period 2, the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize ( p 2 c l )(a p 2 ) which makes p 2 = a+c l = 2
. The …rm's expected pro…t in period 2 is 
Suppose that l mimics h and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. l's pro…t lh then equals lh = (1 h )( p 1l (a p 1l ) c l (a p 1l ) + p 2l (a p 2l ) c l (a p 2l ))
(48) is smaller than (45) if the following holds:
The left side of this inequality is decreasing in and the right side is increasing in . So we have two cases. If a c l a c h < 2, the condition (49) does not hold for 0 < 1 and a separating equilibrium does not exist. Otherwise it holds if is su¢ ciently high.
Secondly, in order to have an equilibrium, h should not have an incentive to switch to reward-based crowdfunding. In this case, this is a trade-o¤ between bankruptcy cost and the cost of moral hazard. If h switches to reward-based crowdfunding its payo¤ equals:
This is less than (44). Consider a situation where h selects reward-based crowdfunding and l selects pro…t-sharing.
Consider …rm l. Similarly to the above analysis we have: p 1 = p 2 = 
Suppose that h mimics l and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. h's pro…t hl then equals hl = (1 l )( p 1h (a p 1h ) c l (a p 1h ) + p 2h (a p 2h ) c l (a p 2h ))
It equals hl = ( a c l )(a c h = ) 2 This is greater than (51) because c l < c h and therefore such an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Consider reward-based crowdfunding. In period 2, the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize (p 2 c b)(s r a p 2 ) which makes p 2 = sra+b+c 2 (all calculations are identical to section 2.1. except that the cost equals c + b).
In period 1, the …rm maximizes (p 1 b c)(a p 1 ) I subject to p 1 q 1 = (p 1 c)(a p 1 ) I + cq 1 = I + c(a p 1 ).
then the …rm will not be able to raise enough funds to launch the production. 
Consider equity-based crowdfunding. In period 2, the …rm chooses p 2 to maximize (1 )(p 2 c b)(s e a p 2 ) which makes p 2 = 
Since (53) is greater than (54) we have two cases. If I is su¢ ciently small ((a c b) 2 4I), resulting from the comparison of (53) and (54), the …rm prefers reward-based crowdfunding to equity-based crowdfunding because s r > s e . As follows from the comparison of (53) and (55), the …rm selects rewardbased crowdfunding if s r is su¢ ciently large or b is su¢ ciently small. This is not surprising given that b re ‡ects the degree of the moral hazard cost under crowdfunding and s r re ‡ects the e¢ ciency of market feedback. Otherwise, the …rm takes a bank loan.
Let us now analyze the role of demand (a) on a …rm's decision-making. The …rm is indi¤erent between reward-based crowdfunding and a bank loan if: 
Since this is a quadratic equation, it implies that for any given value of I, the …rm selects equity-based crowdfunding if a is either very small or very large. Otherwise it takes a bank loan.
If I is su¢ ciently large, the …rm will not be able to use reward-based crowdfunding. As follows from the comparison of (54) and (55), the …rm selects equity-based crowdfunding if s e is su¢ ciently large or b is su¢ ciently small. Otherwise, the …rm takes a bank loan.
The …rm is indi¤erent between equity-based crowdfunding and a bank loan if:
(a b c) 
